The extent and persistence of the global economic and financial crisis has caused many people to start asking if there is any alternative to the current monetary system of fiat money overseen by central banks which enjoy varying — and apparently diminishing — degrees of independence from politicians who seem unable to resist meddling with monetary policy in pursuit of short-term goals (such as their reelection).
Most arguments about the respective merits of fiat money, private money, or the gold standard are couched almost entirely in terms of economic efficiency. Over at Public Discourse, however, Acton’s Research Director Samuel Gregg has penned an article outlining the principled case for a return to the classical gold standard. Gregg draws upon economic history and ethical analysis to argue that there is a strong more-than-economic case for the classical gold standard that rarely receives much attention. As Gregg writes:
There were several economic advantages to the gold standard. . . . A number of principled considerations were, however, also operative. The gold standard placed a high premium on economic security by reducing the uncertainty and risk that flows from fluctuations in the value of money that have nothing to do with the relative valuation of different goods and services. . . .
Another commitment at stake was the conviction that stable money meant greater economic prosperity for increasing numbers of people. Greater monetary certainty spurred productivity and investment, not least because many long-term contracts benefited from a confidence that prices would remain relatively constant over time. Then there were the ways in which the gold standard bolstered the economic well-being of particular marginalized groups. Monetary stability helps, for example, those who lack the financial sophistication to navigate the shoals of inflation, or who are on fixed incomes (e.g., the elderly and disabled).
At the same time the gold standard also encouraged governments to promote the common good instead of narrow sectional interests. Within nation-states, for instance, the gold standard diminished opportunities for the state to manipulate monetary policy in order to favor those with an interest in inflationist policies.
Likewise, the gold standard also generated a commitment on the part of governments to promoting the international common good. As the German economist Wilhelm Röpke once wrote, the gold standard relied upon the unwritten agreement of central banks and governments “to behave in matters of monetary and credit policy in such a way that this fixed and free coupling remained an undisputed permanent institution, irrespective of trade fluctuations”. This required central banks and governments to prioritize the global economy’s long-terms needs over the short-term exigencies of national economies. It also entailed a willingness to resist popular pressures to revert to a type of monetary nationalism in the face of the fluctuations in employment and growth sometimes generated by the gold standard’s adjustment mechanisms.
There is, Gregg notes, bound to be considerable opposition to any move away from fiat money. It’s hard to imagine, for instance, politicians, central banks, or Keynesian-inclined economists being very willing to give up a tool that — or so they believe — is a vital element of macroeconomic management. Gregg points out that there are also plenty of groups with a vested interest in the type of easy money policies (what’s euphemistically called “quantitative easing” these days) which are always an option under fiat money regimes.
Despite this opposition, Gregg says that going back to gold is certainly worth a second look — if only because no one seems especially satisfied with the present system.
For more from Gregg on this subject, see The Gold Standard: A Principled Case.
